Summary of Ayatollah Nouri Hamedani’s Jurisprudential Class 87/12/14

April 22, 2009
Ayatollah Nuri Hamedani

Ayatollah Nuri Hamedani

In this session the Ayatollah discusses the Nahj al-Balaghah and the principles of the ‘Alawi government, its importance, and examples of governance.

The first principle that is mentioned was taking precision in dealing with the public treasury. This was already discussed.

The second principle is that the Islamic leader must live in the same class level as the indigent people of the society.

There are a few points that were discussed regarding indigent people:

First: It is an Islamic command to like indigent people. We must be aware of their pains and must show compassion for them. There are many traditions that state that we must love the impoverished and this is extremely important for the scholars.

There is an ethical point to this as well: when one sits with poor people and compares his life to theirs he will become optimistic about his life. The opposite is true with sitting and socializing with rich people.

Second: Sitting and socializing with poor people.

Third: The Islamic leader must live as a poor person. Not being attached to the world is of utmost importance. The Prophet (s) told Imam Ali (a): “O’ Ali! Allah has adorned you with a beauty and no other servant has been adorned with a beauty that Allah loves more than this. Your beauty is not being attached to the world and love for the impoverished while the impoverished love you.”

The 160th sermon of Nahj al-Balaghah is a sermon where Imam Ali (a) describes the characteristics of the prophets including Prophet Muhammad (s). At the end of the sermon it states: “By Allah, I have been putting patches in my shirts so much that now I feel shy of the patcher. Someone asked me whether I would not put it off, but I said, “Get away from me.” Only in the morning do people (realised the advantage of and) speak highly of the night journey.”

There is a tradition from Imam Baqir (a) which states that Imam Ali ruled the government for five years but did not leave anything as inheritance due to poverty.

A person who has a social position in the society and is attached to the world, from the Islamic point of view, would not be able to perform his duties. This is something that is necessary for scholars as well. The Prophet (s) said that a person who gains knowledge but whose attachment to the world does not lesson to that same degree will distance himself from Allah.

This sermon has many interesting topics in it. The beginning of it is about tawhid and was read because it is good to read the words of the Imams. This part of the sermon states:

O’ my Allah! Praise be to Thee for what Thou takest and givest and for that from which Thou curest or with which Thou afflictest; praise which is the most acceptable to Thee, the most like by Thee and the most dignified before Thee; praise which fills all Thy creation and reaches where Thou desirest; praise which is not veiled from Thee and does not end, and whose continuity does not cease.

We do not know the reality of Thy greatness except that we know that thou art Ever-living and Self-subsisting by Whom all things subsist. Drowsiness or sleep do not overtake Thee, vision does not reach Thee and sight does not grasp Thee. Thou seest the eyes and countest the ages. Thou holdest (people as slaves) by foreheads and feet. We see Thy creation and wonder over it because of Thy might, and describe it as (a result of) Thy great authority; whereas what is hidden from us, of which our sight has fallen short, which our intelligence has not attained, and between which and ourselves curtains of the unknown have been cast, is far greater.

He who frees his heart (from all other engagements) and exerts his thinking in order to know how Thou established Thy throne, how Thou created Thy creatures, how Thou suspended the air in Thy skies and how Thou spread Thy earth on the waves of water, his eyes would return tired, his intelligence defeated, his ears eager and his thinking awander.

It is interesting that at the beginning Imam Ali speaks about the greatness of the world and then he speaks about not being attached to it. The Ayatollah mentioned that when he was younger he studied a little about the universe. He said that there are at least 100 billion galaxies in the world and that in each galaxy there are over 100 billion stars. If you multiply this number you would get 10,000,000,000,000,000 stars. This shows the greatness and enormity of the universe.

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Summary of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s Jurisprudential Class – Hajj as a Will 2

April 22, 2009
Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

The discussion will be about the second ruling of the issues relating to hajj as a will. Imam Khomeini (r) states in Tahrir:

مسألة 2 – يكفي الميقاتي سواء كان الموصى به واجبا أو مندوبا ، لكن الأول من الأصل والثاني من الثلث ، ولو أوصى بالبلدية فالزائد على أجرة الميقاتية من الثلث في الأول وتمامها (هزینه) منه (از ثلث) في الثاني.

The first section is that if one general stipulates a hajj in his will and does not specifically mentioned where the hajj should start from then one can start it from the miqat. It would not be necessary for start the hajj from the hometown of the deceased. This counts for both obligatory and recommended hajjs. The only thing is that the price for the obligatory hajj would be taken from the total estate and the price for the recommended hajj would be taken from the third of the estate.

The second section is if the deceased stipulates in his will that the hajj must be performed from his hometown; in an obligatory hajj it is only obligatory to start it from the miqat and therefore whatever price is in addition to what that would cost (from his hometown to the miqat) would be taken from the third of the estate. If it was a recommended hajj the whole price would be taken from the third of the estate.

This ruling was mentioned before by Imam Khomeini in the discussion of hajj istita’ati, issue number 58. There he stated:

و لو اوصی و لم یعین شیئا (میقاتی باشد یا بلدی) کفت المیقاتیة الا  اذا کان هناک انصراف الی البلدیة (کما اینکه در زمان ما چنین است) او قامت قرینة علی ارادتها (ای ارادة بدلیة مثلا پولی را که تعیین می کند مبلغش سه میلیون است و اگر از میقاتی باشد هزینه ی آن حدود یک میلیون می بود) کفت المیقاتیة فحینئذ (که گفته بلدی بجا آورده شود) تکون الزیادة علی المیقاتیة من الثلث.

He continued to state:

لو اوصی بالبلدی یجب و یحسب الزائد علی اجرة المیقاتیة من الثلث.

Imam Khomeini might have repeated this issue because in this ruling both recommended and obligatory hajjs are mentioned.

Viewpoints of the scholars:

‘Allamah states in Mukhtalif, v.4, p.369:

لو أوصى بالحج أخرج عنه من أقرب الأماكن إلى الميقات اختاره الشیخ فی المبسوط و صرح ابن ادریس بلزوم الحج من الموضوع الذی مات فیه من بلده و هو الذی ورد فی روایات اصحابنا

The author of Hada’iq states, v.14, p.176:

لا خلاف بین الاصحاب فی انه اذا استقر الحج فی ذمته ثم مات یقضی من اصل الترکة انما الخلاف فی المکان الذی یجب الاستیجار منه و المتداول فی کتب اکثر الاصحاب ان الخلاف هنا منحصر فی قولین احدها انه من اقرب الاماکن الی مکة و هو الذی علیه الاکثر و ثانیهما انه من بلده.

Then he added that the understanding of Muhaqiq’s phrase in Sharaya’ in which there is a third opinion is that if the person’s money is sufficient to perform the hajj from his hometown then he must and if it is not then he must perform it from the miqat.

A summary of the views is:

1. Majority – Hajj starts from the miqat

2. Minority – Hajj starts from the hometown

3. Details that the author of Hada’iq mentioned

4. The place of death does not mean the hometown and does not mean the miqat

Proofs of the ruling:

Principles: The principle here states that hajj starts from the miqat. Therefore, the distance between the hometown and the miqat is a preliminary and not obligatory.

‘Allamah mentions some nice examples of this in Mukhtalaf: if a person does not intend on performing hajj and when he reaches the miqat he sees that it is the time of hajj and he must perform an obligatory hajj. Therefore, he decides there to perform hajj. His hajj is definitely correct and suffices for his hajj al-Islam.

Likewise, if a person leaves his hometown for somewhere else on business and the time of hajj approaches. He decides to perform the hajj from the second location that he is in even though it is not his hometown. Again, his hajj al-Islam would be correct.

In short, the pillars of hajj start from the miqat and all of the other actions, for instance, leaving from one’s hometown are preliminaries. Now, since the ruling is this way for the person himself it would be the same for his representative.

This is the ruling that we would come to without looking at the traditions.

Traditions:

There are a few groups of traditions in this section. The first group is in opposition to the viewpoint of the majority (that hajj must be performed from the hometown).

The second section of the chapters on representation:

ح 1: مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ الْحَسَنِ بِإِسْنَادِهِ عَنْ مُوسَى بْنِ الْقَاسِمِ عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ مَحْبُوبٍ عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ رِئَابٍ قَالَ سَأَلْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع عَنْ رَجُلٍ أَوْصَى أَنْ يُحَجَّ عَنْهُ حَجَّةَ الْإِسْلَامِ وَ لَمْ يَبْلُغْ جَمِيعُ مَا تَرَكَ إِلَّا خَمْسِينَ دِرْهَماً قَالَ يُحَجُّ عَنْهُ مِنْ بَعْضِ الْمَوَاقِيتِ الَّتِي وَقَّتَهَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ص مِنْ قُرْبٍ.

The chain of narration of this tradition is correct.

The understanding of this tradition is that if he has enough money they he must perform hajj from his hometown. In other words, the person asking the question knows that if he has enough money he must perform it from his hometown and the Imam did not negate this. The fact that the Imam did not negate this proves that one should only perform the hajj from the miqat in this situation, or else, if he has enough money they he must perform it from his hometown.

ح 2: عَنْ مُحَمَّدٍ وَ أَحْمَدَ ابْنَيِ الْحَسَنِ عَنْ أَبِيهِمَا عَنْ‏ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ بُكَيْرٍ عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع أَنَّهُ سُئِلَ عَنْ رَجُلٍ أَوْصَى بِمَالِهِ فِي الْحَجِّ فَكَانَ لَا يَبْلُغُ مَا يُحَجُّ بِهِ مِنْ بِلَادِهِ قَالَ فَيُعْطَى فِي الْمَوْضِعِ الَّذِي يُحَجُّ بِهِ عَنْهُ

The questioner thought that he must perform hajj from his hometown and the Imam stated that he must start it from wherever his money would allow and that it is not necessary to perform more than that.

ح 3: مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَعْقُوبَ عَنْ عِدَّةٍ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ أَبِي نَصْرٍ عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ قَالَ سَأَلْتُ أَبَا الْحَسَنِ الرِّضَا ع عَنِ الرَّجُلِ يَمُوتُ فَيُوصِي بِالْحَجِّ مِنْ أَيْنَ يُحَجُّ عَنْهُ قَالَ عَلَى قَدْرِ مَالِهِ إِنْ وَسِعَهُ مَالُهُ فَمِنْ مَنْزِلِهِ وَ إِنْ لَمْ يَسَعْهُ مَالُهُ فَمِنَ الْكُوفَةِ فَإِنْ لَمْ يَسَعْهُ مِنَ الْكُوفَةِ فَمِنَ الْمَدِينَةِ.

The denotation of this tradition is also clear. The Imam clearly states that if he has enough money he must perform the hajj from his hometown.

ح 7: عَنْ أَبِي عَلِيٍّ الْأَشْعَرِيِّ عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ عَنْ مُحَسِّنِ بْنِ أَحْمَدَ عَنْ أَبَانٍ عَنْ عُمَرَ بْنِ يَزِيدَ قَالَ قُلْتُ لِأَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع رَجُلٌ أُوصِيَ بِحَجَّةٍ فَلَمْ تَكْفِهِ قَالَ فَيُقَدِّمُهَا حَتَّى يُحَجَّ دُونَ الْوَقْتِ (وقت به معنای میقات است)

All of these traditions are the first group of traditions which are in opposition to the majority opinion. We must read the other group of traditions and then come to a conclusion.


Summary of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s Jurisprudential Class – Hajj as a Will 1

April 6, 2009
Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Hajj as a will

The discussion was about the first ruling in regards to hajj being in a will. We reached the fourth section which. Here the deceased willed for a hajj to be performed on his behalf and we do not know whether this hajj is obligatory, taken from the total estate, or whether it is a recommended hajj, taken from the third of the estate.

This issue has not been mentioned much and the author of ‘Arwah is one of the people who discussed the issue in detail.

This section has three cases:

First case: we state that this means that it is an obligatory hajj meaning that the hajj that the deceased willed was an obligatory hajj and the price of it must be taken from the total estate.

The author of ‘Awrah and others believe that a person who lives far away from Mecca usually does not will a recommended hajj. If the majority of the time when one makes a will and when they mention hajj they mean an obligatory hajj then we could use that as a proof for the hajj being obligatory. The will of such people would mean an obligatory hajj.

Muhaqiq Thani criticizes this understanding while commentating on ‘Arwah. He states: “Sometimes people make a will for a precautionary hajj meaning that they performed their hajj, but per precaution, they make a will for another hajj to be performed on their behalf (of course they did not state that this was a precautionary hajj or else it would be outside of the scope of the discussion). This case is not something abnormal and that is why we cannot consider that the hajj definitely means an obligatory hajj.

His words bring about certainty and take away the notion that this hajj definitely points to an obligatory hajj.

Second case: This is when the hajj has a previous state meaning that at one time during his lifetime we know that hajj became obligatory on him and he did not perform it, but we doubt if he performed it later on or not.

Point: This istishab concerns a doubt about the subject, not the ruling because the principle of this ruling that if the hajj is obligatory the price of it is taken from the total estate and if the hajj is recommended the price of it is taken from the third of the estate. But, we doubt about the subject – whether the hajj that the deceased has to perform is obligatory or recommended.

There are two problems in this istishab:

One: in istishab the doubt of the person making the will is a condition not the person carrying out the will. We do not know whether the person who made the will had a doubt for us to use istishab or not because the action is in regards to the person who made the will – therefore we cannot implement istishab.

Answer: It is clear that the doubt is about the duty of the person carrying out the will not the duty of the person who made the will because the doubt is about whether or not the person carrying out the will has to take the price of this hajj from the total estate or from the third of the estate. The person who made the will passed away and does not have any duty.

Two: The principle of considering the actions of a Muslim as correct precedes istishab meaning that one does not know if the deceased sinned and did not perform his hajj. In this case we must consider his action to be correct and say that he was a believer and insha’Allah he performed his hajj not sinning.

In other words, if we do not consider the actions of a Muslim correct and we implement istishab we will be faced with a problem because after the death of any Muslim we doubt whether he paid his religious taxes or not and we doubt whether or not he paid his debts.

It must be observed that considering a Muslim’s actions as correct is not only in matters of his actions meaning that the principle is not only implemented when a Muslim performs an action, rather it is in regards to his duties. For instance, we are invited as someone’s guest and we do not know whether or not he paid his religious dues for us to be able to eat his food. Here, we implement the principle that a Muslim’s actions are considered correct and his food becomes permissible for us to eat.

In addition to this the principle of what is in a Muslim’s hands is his property states that the property that was in his hands at the time of his death was his. This means that religious dues were not mixed in with it. The principle of istishab states that if a time existed that you knew that he did not pay his religious dues than now you can say that he did not pay them, but the mentioned principle precedes istishab.

In short, it does not seem in my view that istishab can be implemented here.

Third case: The hajj does not have a previous state and does not denote obligation per se. Only, the will of the deceased is in our hands and he states that a hajj must be performed on his behalf.

This issue is included in the doubts over a specific instance. This means that we have a universal which is that it is obligatory to act in accordance to the will and we have an exception that recommended actions are taken from the third of the estate. We doubt whether this instance falls under the universal or the specific.

In the principles of jurisprudence it is mentioned that it is not permissible to act in accordance to the universal while in doubt about whether it falls under the specific or not. For instance, if it is stated that we must honor the scholars and that we must not honor the corrupt scholars, then if we doubt whether or not Zayd, who is a scholar, is corrupt or not. In this case we cannot act in accordance to the universal and we cannot act in accordance to the specific. In this case the principle of bara’at is implemented in regards to the obligation of honoring Zayd negating the obligation.

In the case that we are discussing, we must find the amount that is certain and state that the universal principle is: “Whatever a deceased leaves is for his inheritors, except a third.” The amount that is certain is that if the deceased leaves a will it cannot surpass a third of his estate.

Therefore, we state that in the fourth section the price of the hajj must be taken from the third of the estate.


Poem about life and Imam Hussayn (a)

April 5, 2009

This is a poem that a good friend of mine in the UK shared with me. I thought it was very interesting and decided to share it with all of you:

My existence is empty and full of regress.
Darkness surrounds me I lay in distress
A chill shivers up my lifeless bones
Painless I am tortured, my body moans
Running out of breath, and in despair
I take a deep breath but feel no air,
I feel a darkness inside and exhale,
I thought I was strong but now I am frail
My body moves empty, no sign of a soul
Restless and weeping, with no control
This dying soul cries loud of oppression
Making me lifeless, with no expression
Doubts flood into mask the way I think
My thoughts going wild, I begin to shrink
I control nothing I am no longer free
I stand for nothing, everything controls me.
Losing you O Allah is the biggest fall,
Who without you can stand at all?
A fall so deep that you cannot rise
If one loses you, his existence dies
These bones and skin they do remain
But the heart is where you feel the pain
And that is when it struck me deep
Husayn your words woke me from my sleep

O Allah, what did he find who lost you,
And what did he loose who found you.

A revolution sharply begins to rise
Tears of repentance reach my eyes
Looking down in humility I begin to cry
Trembling my hopeful hands go high
My broken body falls into prostration
Submissively I beg, with desperation
With the earth on my face I can feel once more
I feel a warmth which I could not before
I once again feel the beating of my heart
I lose the binding darkness with this new start.
The message of my master has rung so clear
Before I was weak, now only Allah I fear,
King of martyrs your words were my light
Now I see guidance, they gave me sight
May my blood and my tears be for you
For now your name is what gets me through
Whenever I am down, surrounded by pains
Your words give me life and break my chains
They gave my life meaning and helped me to gain
So my life is at your service, now I wait O Husayn…..

– Sayyid Mohsin Jafri


Summary of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s jurisprudential class 87/12/13

March 30, 2009

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

The 17th Ruling:

يجوز التبرع عن الميت في الحج الواجب مطلقا و المندوب بل يجوز التبرع عنه بالمندوب و إن كان عليه الواجب حتى قبل الاستيجار له و كذا يجوز الاستيجار عنه في المندوب مطلقا و قد مر حكم الحي في الواجب و أما المندوب فيجوز التبرع عنه كما يجوز الاستيجار له حتى إذا كان عليه حج واجب لا يتمكن من أدائه فعلا بل مع تمكنه أيضا فالاستيجار للمندوب قبل أداء الواجب إذا لم يخل بالواجب لا يخلو من قوة كما أن الأقوى صحة التبرع عنه.

The foundation of this ruling is in regards to performing the tabra’a hajj on behalf of a living or deceased person. At the beginning the tabra’a on behalf of a deceased person is mentioned and then on behalf of a living person.

But, the discussion of the tabra’a hajj (of an obligatory hajj) on behalf of a deceased person: All Shia scholars agree that this is permissible, but there are differences amongst the Sunni scholars.

Viewpoints of the Shia scholars:

Muhaqiq Naraqi states in Mustanad, v.11, p.137:

لو حج أحد – عن ميت وجب عليه الحج – تبرعا ، برئت ذمته وصح ، سواء ترك الميت مالا أو لا ، وسواء كان المتبرع وليا أم لا بالاجماع المحقق و المحكي مستفيضا و المستفيضة من الصحاح و غيرها الخالية عن المعارض بالمرة

Shaheed says the same thing in Masalik, v.2, p.177.

Muhadath Bahrani states, v.14, p.287, ruling three:

الظاهر أنه لا خلاف بين الأصحاب ( رضوان الله عليهم ) في أنه لو تبرع انسان بالحج عن غيره بعد موته فإنه يكون مجزئا عنه وتبرأ ذمته به و ظاهرهم انه لا فرق فی ذلک بین ان یخلف المیت ما یحج به عنه ام لا و لا فی المتبرع بین ان یکون ولیا او غیره.

The author of Jawahir states, v.17, p.387:

و لو تبرع إنسان بالحج عن غيره بعد موته برئت ذمته … بلا خلاف أجده في شئ من ذلك بل الاجماع بقسميه عليه بل النصوص مستفيضة أو متواترة فيه من غير فرق في الميت بين أن يكون عنده ما يحج به عنه أم لا ، وبين إيصائه به وعدمه ، وبين قرب المتبرع للميت و عدمه ، و بين وجود المأذون من الميت أو وليه و عدمه كل ذلك لاطلاق النصوص ومعاقد الاجماعات.

Viewpoints of Sunni scholars:

The following is mentioned in Mawsu’ah Kuwaitiyah, v.17, p.75:

اما المیت فیجوز حج الغیر عنه بدون وصیته عند الحنفیة و المالکیة و استثنی الحنفیة اذا حج او احج عن مورثه بغیر اذنه فانه یجزیه و ذهب الشافعیة و الحنابلة الی انه من مات و علیه حج وجب الاحجاج عنه من جمیع ترکته و لو حج عنه اجنبی جاز و ان لم یاذن له الوارث کما یقضی دینه بغیر اذن الوارث.

The conclusion of the opinions is that our scholars do not have any differences of opinions in regards to performing a tabra’a hajj on behalf of a deceased person, but this issue is disputed amongst Sunni scholars. He has mentioned three of their views:

  1. Prohibition – Malikiyah
  2. Prohibition, except if the person performing the tabra’a hajj is an inheritor – Hanifiyah
  3. Permission – Hanabilah and Shafi’iyah

Proofs of the issue:

According to principles it must be said that the principle of responsibility would be applied here. This would mean that if there is no proof stating that the tabra’a hajj performed for an obligatory hajj of a deceased person is sufficient for him then the deceased would still be responsible for his obligatory hajj. The tabra’a would not be sufficient.

On the other hand, rational people agree that a third party can pay off someone else’s debt because there is a relationship between the debtor and the person in debt and when the person in debt agrees that a third person can pay off his debt than that could happen and his debt would be relieved.

Now, we must see if hajj is a debt in which this rational principle can be applied to or not.

Other acts of worship (for instance fasting and prayer) cannot be called debts. But, there are many traditions which state that hajj is a debt that Allah has on our shoulders. This is especially seen in the tradition of Khuth’amiyah, which is accepted by both Sunnis and Shias and is in regards to a living person who unable to perform hajj. Here the infallible states:

ان دَيْنَ اللَّهِ فَإِنَّهُ أَحَقُّ بِالْقَضَاءِ.


Book Review: Ideological and Jurisprudential Frontiers of Islam

March 28, 2009

Ayatollah Mohsen Araki

Ayatollah Mohsen Araki

This is an interesting book of questions sent to and answered by Ayatollah Mohsen Araki. He answers all of the jurisprudential questions in accordance to the views of Sayyid Ali Khamenei and Imam Khomeini.

First I want to introduce Ayatollah Mohsen Araki. He is a prominent Islamic scholar being a student of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. He was the official representative of Sayyid Ali Khamenei (the supreme leader) in England for a number of years, ending in 2004.

There are numerous questions on numerous topics including Islamic ideology and practical laws. The subjects of the practical laws are taharah, prayer, fasting, khums, marriage, divorce, forbidden sources of income, eating and drinking, and miscellaneous rulings. It is a must for those who perform taqlid to Sayyid Ali Khamenei.

The one criticism that I have of the book is that the translation is not the best. The English could be improved. It was translated by Ayatollah Araki’s son-in-law Hujjatul Islam Hayder Shriazi. May Allah bless him for his efforts, but it would be a great idea to have it edited and republished.

Despite the English I would definitely recommend this book to all Muslims, even those who do not perform taqleed to Sayyid Ali Khamenei, and especially I would recommend it to those who do perform taqleed to him. The answers given to ideological questions are deep and everyone can benefit from them.

Details of the Book:

Ideological And Jurisprudential Frontiers of Islam

Printed in Great Britain, 1999

Copyright – Islamic Centre England – London

ISBN 1 900560 50 x


Summary of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s jurisprudential class 87/12/12

March 28, 2009

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi

The discussion was about the 16th ruling of representation in hajj. Imam Khomeini mentioned this ruling with two sections:

The first section was when one wants to hire someone who does not have enough time to perform the tamatu’ hajj and who must change his intention to the ifrad hajj.

The second section was when one hires someone who has enough time to perform the tamatu’ hajj and then something arises which creates a problem for him and he is forced to change his intention to the ifrad hajj.

The question about the first section whether or not the person that one wants to hire has entered the state of ihram or not. Apparently Imam Khomeini is mentioning the case when the person entered the state of ihram or else changing one’s intentions would not make sense. Now that he has entered the state of ihram, with what intention did he do so? It is clear that he did not enter the state of ihram with the intention of the person who wants to hire him. He either entered it with his own intention or with the intention of someone else. It is clear that such an ihram, one that has been entered with a special intention, cannot be changed. Therefore, the possibility that the person entered the state of ihram is negated (although the meaning of ‘change’ occurs after ihram).

But, the second possibility is that he has not entered the state of ihram and his time became short while he was close to Mecca. He wants to enter the state of ihram and if he does so he would have to quickly head off for Arafat – one wants to hire him in this state. The ruling is that it is impermissible to hire him here because his responsibility is the ifrad hajj and the responsibility of the person who wants to be represented is the tamatu’ hajj (according to this ‘change’ means that the divine ruling in his regard has been changed from tamatu’ to ifrad. Although this is in opposition to the apparent meaning of the text we will accept it in order to correct Imam Khomeini’s words).

One must either find someone else who is able to perform the tamatu’ hajj, for instance a person who is very quick and can perform the tamatu’ umrah and then reach Arafat or wait until next year.

Does the person whose time has become shortened and who has the responsibility of performing a tamatu’ hajj have to wait until next year to perform hajj or can he perform the ifrad hajj being sufficient for his hajj al-Islam? It is clear that such a person has an inability in regards to time and must wait a year to be able to perform his hajj al-Islam.

The second section is a section that has differences of opinions. It is when one hires somebody who has plenty time to perform the tamatu’ hajj and then because of various reasons, illness or whatever, is unable to perform hajj in its appropriate time. When he gets better he is forced to go straight to Arafat after entering the state of ihram. Imam Khomeini first states that the representative must change his intention to an ifrad hajj and then he states that, as per an obligatory precaution, this hajj would not suffice for the person he is representing.

The question arises as to why Imam Khomeini stated that this hajj does not suffice when the ‘change’ is correct. The only thing we could do is state that this precaution is a recommended precaution – but this is in opposition to the apparent meaning of the text. Or, we could say that the change is a change to a mufridah umrah so that he could leave the state of ihram.

But, the second opinion that the author of ‘Awrah accepted is that it is not permissible to change his intention and it is not sufficient for the person being represented. It is clear that if the change of intention is not correct the hajj would not be sufficient.

The third opinion has been given by a number of people who commentated on ‘Arwah, including Muhaqiq Burujerdi and Golpaygani. They state that both the change of intention is correct and the hajj is sufficient.

All of these opinions revolve around the traditions of changing one’s intention. There are 16 traditions in the 21st chapter of the chapters of categories of hajj in Wasa’il al-Shia. These traditions state that if a person performing the tamatu’ hajj is inflicted and cannot perform it in time he must change his intention to an ifrad hajj.

These traditions must be reviewed to see whether they are only about a person performing hajj for himself or whether they include representatives as well.

In our opinion the third opinion is correct. We have stated that there is a generality mentioned in the traditions of changing intentions. This solves our problem and states that a person who has become a representative has the same rulings in regards to the manners and conditions of hajj as a person who was performing the hajj for himself would have. If there was an exception it must have been mentioned.

The following was not mentioned by Imam Khomeini, but the author of ‘Arwah and its commentators mentioned it. It is in relation to the third opinion which states that changing ones intention is permissible and the hajj is sufficient – but, does the representative deserve the payment or not? There are three opinions here:

  1. He does not deserve the payment because he was hired to perform a tamatu’ hajj, but he performed an ifrad hajj. The duty of the person being represented is taken care of but he did not act in accordance to the contract.
  2. The full payment must be given when the duty of the represented is taken care of. This is like a person who entered the state of ihram and then died after entering the sanctuary. It was stated that he deserves the full payment.
  3. If the contract was in reference to taking care of the represented’s responsibility the full payment must be given, but if it was for a tamatu’ hajj in particular then he does not deserve the payment (he would not even deserve a payment for a similar action). But, in most cases the purpose is taking care of the represented’s responsibility and in this case he would deserve the payment.

Imam Khomeini did not mentioned the issue of payment because, according to his view, the obligatory precaution was that the hajj was not sufficient and therefore there would be no need of payment.

The 16th ruling is now finished.

All that has been mentioned so far was about hired hajjs. The 17th ruling and up is about a tabra’a hajj which is when a person performs hajj for someone because of Allah. Sometimes he performs it on behalf of a deceased person and sometimes on behalf of a living person. Sometimes, in either case, it is obligatory and sometimes it is recommended.